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CHOICE AND
COMPETITION
IN EDUCATION
It is generally agreed that children’s life
chances should not be determined by 
their circumstances of birth. And yet
‘intergenerational mobility’ – a measure of
the degree to which people’s social status
changes between generations – has fallen
between the cohort of British children
who grew up in the 1960s and early
1970s and those who grew up in the
1970s and 1980s. Children born to poor
families are now less likely to break free of
their background and fulfil their potential
than they were in the past.
This social science ‘fact’ – uncovered in 
a series of studies by the Centre for
Economic Performance (CEP) – is 
now in the national bloodstream,
mentioned almost daily by politicians 
and commentators. But what is to be
done about it?
Since children’s attainment in school is
crucial for their future employment and
earnings, one key policy arena has to be
education. And while the headline aim of
the government’s school choice agenda is
to raise standards across the board, there
is also a focus on giving low-achieving
children from poorer families a better deal
in the education system.
Our cover story in this CentrePiece explores
whether the reforms are having the desired
effects. So far, the results are discouraging:
there is some evidence that market
mechanisms in education lead to better
performance, but such improvements may
come at the cost of even greater
inequalities and social polarisation.
CEP research has been influential on an
international stage too, with Tony Venables’
overview of the ‘new economic geography’
launching last summer’s symposium at the
annual gathering of the world’s central
bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. In his
opening remarks, US Federal Reserve
chairman Ben Bernanke also cited two of
our recent studies of productivity.
CEP researchers are also prominent in the
first issue of an annual publication from
the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC). Britain Today: The State of the
Nation in 2007 features Mark
Schankerman (the new director of our
research programme on productivity and
innovation) on the contribution that
university research – in both the natural
and social sciences – makes to national
productivity and long-run growth.
The ESRC magazine also includes
summaries of CEP research on
‘productivity races’, mental illness,
computers in schools and the benefits of
reducing barriers to trade via liberalisation
and new transport infrastructure. 
Look for it on newsstands or at
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/.
And as ever, feedback on CentrePiece
would be most welcome.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@compuserve.com
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We know that freer trade between countries
usually increases efficiency by reallocating
resources from less productive plants to
more productive plants. Holger Breinlich
finds that it can also have a significant
impact on mergers and acquisitions activity –
which has important implications for
competition policy.
Trade 
liberalisation
and the market for 
corporate control
W
hat are the effects
of freer trade on
employment,
productivity and
other aspects of
economic activity? Recent research in the
area has shifted attention from broad
cross-country comparisons towards firm-
and plant-level responses to trade
liberalisation. This focus on micro-level
adjustment processes has allowed
researchers to disentangle the influence of
trade from other factors that shape
economic activity.
A central insight from these studies is
that a substantial part of the impact of
freer trade works through a reallocation of
resources across individual plants and
firms. In particular, the contraction and
exit of low productivity establishments and
the expansion of more productive ones
can explain a sizeable share of aggregate
productivity increases (and job losses)
found in the wake of trade liberalisations.
But a question that remains unresolved
is whether plant closure, contraction and
expansion really are all there is to firm-
level adjustment to free trade. In
particular, only scarce attention has so far
been paid to adjustment through the
market for corporate control – that is,
through mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
This is despite the fact that M&As can,
in principle, play a similar role as the
adjustment processes highlighted in
previous research. Instead of closing down
establishments, reducing output or exiting
altogether, firms also have the option to
search for buyers interested in all or parts
of their operations. Similarly, expanding
firms can buy and integrate other firms
rather than increasing production at
existing plants or opening new ones.
My research tries to fill this gap by
evaluating empirically whether M&As do
indeed play a role in industrial
restructuring in the face of trade
liberalisation. This is not only of academic
interest but could have much wider
implications. Most importantly, M&As are
not just another way of transferring
resources but are likely to be qualitatively
different from the other forms of
adjustment in that they are swifter and
potentially more efficient.
Instead of workers and capital
becoming unemployed for some period
before being rehired, acquisitions allow for
an immediate transfer into new
ownership. M&As also allow the takeover
of entire production structures, which may
be most efficient if preserved as a whole.
These observations might have important
implications for the design of competition
policy after trade liberalisation.
The first question, however, is whether
we can indeed link increases in M&A
activity to trade liberalisation. I approach
this question by examining the impact of
one particular liberalisation: the 1989
Canada-United States free trade
agreement (CUSFTA), under which the
two countries agreed to phase out their
bilateral tariff barriers within a decade. 
I look at manufacturing firms, since these
produce the largest fraction of tradable
goods and are thus most directly affected
by trade liberalisation.
Figure 1 shows that there was a jump
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Figure 2:
Number of M&A transactions, comparing the manufacturing
industries with the highest and lowest tariff cuts as a result of
the CUSFTA (1988 = 100)
Source: Thomson Financial, Statistics Canada, author’s calculations
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Figure 1:
Number of M&A transactions in manufacturing in Canada
and the United States (1988 = 100)
Source: Thomson Financial, author’s calculations
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in M&A activity in Canadian
manufacturing in 1989, the first year of
tariff cuts. Nothing much seems to have
happened in the United States but that is
consistent with what we would expect.
Since the US market is ten times the size
of Canada, the trade integration shock
was much smaller there. Still, we would
like to be sure that nothing else was going
on at the time of the CUSFTA’s
implementation that might have caused
this jump, for example, changes in
economy-wide activity or stock market
valuations.
This is why Figure 2 plots two lines in
the figures for both the United States and
Canada. The solid line represents M&A
activity in the 50% of industries most
affected by the CUSFTA, that is, the ones
with the highest domestic tariff cuts.
Obviously, there will be greater pressure
for adjustment after trade liberalisation
the larger the increase in exposure to
foreign competition, that is, the larger the
tariff cuts. We would thus expect this line
to be above the dashed one (which
represents the remaining 50% of
industries) after 1989 but not before it.
Again, this was clearly the case for
Canada and much less for the United
States. In other words, it seems that M&A
activity changed after 1989 in exactly the
way we would expect if trade liberalisation
drove the changes.
The results from these simple graphs
are supported by more complex
econometric evidence, quantifying the
different effects. In particular, I find that
every percentage point cut in domestic
tariffs led to an increase in M&A activity in
Canada of the order of 10-11%. Given
that the average tariff cut across Canadian
industries was 7 percentage points, this
implies a trade-induced increase in M&A
activity of over 70%.
The increase in the United States 
was again much smaller: an increase in
M&A activity of 0.7-0.9% per percentage
point in tariff cuts. Given that US 
domestic tariffs only declined by about 
4 percentage points, this yields an overall
effect of just 3%.
While the figures for Canada are
certainly very large, they are not
implausible: the number of domestic M&A
transactions in Canada increased by over
300% in the 1990s (and by 150% in the
United States). While the CUSFTA thus
played a role, it was certainly not the only
influence on M&A activity.
Having established that the CUSFTA
led to an increase in M&A activity, I now
turn to two related questions. First,
previous studies focusing on plant
closures, contractions or expansions have
shown that resources seem to be
transferred towards more productive firms
and plants after trade liberalisation (since
these are the ones that expand). Thus, the
question arises whether M&As also
transfer resources towards more
productive owners.
My research suggests that this is
indeed the case: Canadian acquirers were
on average 9-16% more productive than
Yearly sample averages 1985-97 Canada United States Total
(1) Total employment (’000s) 757.0 15496.8 16253.8
(2) Gross job reductions at continuing firms (’000s) 32.6 744.7 777.3
(3) Job reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation (’000s) 0.5 11.2 11.6
(4) Job transfers through M&A (’000s) 14.3 263.3 277.6
(5) Total job transfers (’000s) – sum of (2)-(4) 47.4 1019.2 1066.5
(6) Total job transfers as percentage of employment – (5)/(1) 6.3% 6.6% 6.6%
(7) M&A as percentage of total job transfers – (4)/(5) 30.2% 25.8% 26.0%
(1) Total output (millions of 1995 US$) 147,448 3,007,327 3,154,775
(2) Gross output reductions at continuing firms 
(millions of 1995 US$) 7,159 96,564 103,723
(3) Output reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation 
(millions of 1995 US$) 101 1,374 1,476
(4) Output transfers through M&A (millions of 1995 US$) 3,812 42,744 46,556
(5) Total output transfers (millions of 1995 US$)
– sum of (2)-(4) 11,072 140,682 151,755
(6) Total output transfers as percentage of output – (5)/(1) 7.5% 4.7% 4.8%
(7) M&A as percentage of total output transfers – (4)/(5) 34.4% 30.4% 30.7%
Note: The table shows the amount of job and output transfers via contraction at continuing firms
and via exit by bankruptcy/liquidation and M&A. ‘Total employment’ and ‘Total output’ are
obtained by summing over all firms active in a given year. ‘Gross job/output reductions at contin-
uing firms’ are the sum over all employment/output reductions at continuing firms as compared
to the previous year. ‘Job/output reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation’ and ‘Job/output
transfers through M&A’ are the sum over the last available employment/sales figures for firms
exiting the dataset in a given year due to bankruptcy/liquidation or M&A.
Source: Compustat, author's calculations
Table 1:
Resource transfer in Canadian and US manufacturing firms
via contraction, M&A and bankruptcy
Mergers 
and
acquisitions
are an
efficient 
way of
transferring
resources
towards more
productive
owners
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Canadian targets. Since previous research
has shown that M&As tend to increase
joint productivity levels when the acquirer
is more productive, this suggests that the
CUSFTA triggered an efficiency-enhancing
M&A boom in Canada.
My second question is whether the
observed increase in M&A activity is
quantitatively important compared with
the forms of adjustment previously
studied. Table 1 provides some evidence in
the affirmative. It reports that in the
period studied (1985-97), M&As were
responsible for about 30% of output and
employment transfers away from
contracting firms.
To summarise, it seems that CUSFTA
did lead to an increase in M&A activity,
that resources were transferred from less
to more productive firms in the process
and that the magnitude of the overall
transfer was quantitatively important.
These findings highlight the fact that
adjustment to freer trade can take less
drastic forms than firm and plant closure
and the associated mass layoffs of workers
and liquidation of capital. Indeed, if M&A
does represent a swifter and more efficient
way of transferring resources between
firms, this has important implications for
competition policy.
In particular, one would like antitrust
authorities to facilitate the necessary
transfer of resources by reducing
restrictions on acquisitions in the wake of
trade liberalisations. Given the generally
higher level of restrictions imposed on
M&A activity in developing countries, this
proposition could be of particular
relevance there.
This line of thought is reminiscent of
certain strands of research in corporate
finance (notably those associated with
Michael Jensen), which argue that
takeovers represent a far superior way of
restructuring industries than internal
adjustments or bankruptcy and as such
should not face unnecessary legal
restrictions.
This article summarises ‘Trade Liberalisation
and Industrial Restructuring through Mergers
and Acquisitions’ by Holger Breinlich, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 717
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0717.pdf).
Holger Breinlich is a lecturer in economics at
the University of Essex and a research
associate in CEP’s globalisation programme.
Trade liberalisations like 
the 1989 Canada-United
States free trade agreement
increase M&A activity
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C
hoice in education is an
issue that ranks high on
the political agendas of
governments around the
world and is increasingly
being pushed hard in the UK. While many
regard choice as a value per se, most
proponents emphasise the improvement
in educational standards that could result
from it.
There are two main economic
arguments for moving from a
neighbourhood-based system – in which
pupils attend their local school – to a
system based on parental choice. The first
is about allocation: more choice allows
better matching of pupils with schools
according to personal tastes and
pedagogical needs. If every parent can find
a school that educates their child at least
as effectively as under a neighbourhood-
based system, then average achievement
must improve.
The second argument is about
teaching technology: if families are free to
choose, then the mechanisms of market
discipline will ensure that schools offer
high standards. For this to work, school
finances (and headteachers’ incentives)
must be linked to school popularity via
pupil numbers: unpopular schools must
lose pupils and money while popular
schools gain pupils and additional funding.
So schools must innovate and adapt to
meet parental demand for ‘quality’ or
shrink and ultimately close.
There are counter-arguments in
defence of a neighbourhood-based school
admission system. For example, it is
claimed that teaching proceeds better in a
stable environment, where teachers are not
under competitive pressures. Classes in a
choice-based system may suffer higher
pupil turnover, which can further disrupt
teaching. And the distances that pupils
have to travel will be greater under a
choice-based system, and this may have a
detrimental effect on achievement because
of lateness or stress.
But the biggest concern about wider
parental choice seems to be that even if it
has the potential to boost pupil
achievements, this may come at the cost of
increased inequality across schools. The
fear is that if the most disadvantaged
families are least able to exercise choice,
then less socially disadvantaged, higher
ability pupils will end up concentrated in
schools with the best resources and
teaching, so that the gains from
competition are unevenly distributed. 
But there are also reasons to think that
breaking the link between where pupils
live and where they attend school will
reduce inequalities between schools. This
might happen if, for example, pupils in
social housing can more easily access
schools in better neighbourhoods.
Since the theoretical advantages of
competition and choice seem so uncertain,
is the current policy focus on expansion of
parental choice and school competition
founded on a strong evidence base?
Unfortunately not: extensive US
research using various methods and data
A central focus of current education policy is to
expand parents’ choice over where their
children go to school and to promote
competition between schools. A long-running
CEP research programme by Stephen Gibbons,
Stephen Machin and Olmo Silva has been
assessing the effects on both educational
outcomes and inequalities between schools.
The educational impact of
parental choice
and school
competition
sources is very mixed in its findings about
the performance effects of this type of
policy. The scant UK-based research has
been similarly inconclusive. Moreover, none
of the evidence so far reveals whether any
improvements in educational standards are
caused by pupils finding more suitable
schools or by efficiency gains induced by
market discipline. 
More has been written about the
effects of choice and competition on
segregation in the UK context, but again
there is no consensus. Much of this work
is based on observations of what has
happened in schools since the reforms
started in the late 1980s: while some
researchers claim that these reforms led to
a decrease in social stratification, others
find evidence for the opposite.
So, on the basis of the available
international evidence, the conclusion that
the gains from competition and choice
more than compensate for any losses
resulting from greater inequality – what
US education economist Caroline Hoxby
calls ‘a tide that lifts all boats’ – seems
unduly optimistic.
Measuring choice and
competition in education
Our research has mainly focused on the
effects of parental choice and school
competition on pupil progress during
primary education. As a measure of choice
we use detailed information on where
pupils live and where they go to school in
order to work out which alternative
schools they had available. Knowing this,
we can deduce which schools are
‘competitive’ – in the sense that their
pupils had many choices available – and
which are not. 
Our study focuses on an area around
and including London, which encompasses
200,000 pupils in 2,400 primary schools.
The area is urban and suburban in
character, but there is great variation in
the number of schools that are accessible
from a particular home.
How do we work out which schools a
pupil can reach from their home? We do
this by studying how far other children
travel to local schools. So, for example, if
pupils at Springfield Primary travel, on
average, 1km to school and Lisa lives
within 1km of Springfield Primary, then we
would treat Springfield Primary as a
possible choice for Lisa – even if she
actually attends a different school.
Once we know how many choices
pupils have, it is easy to work out which
schools are more competitive: simply
calculate the average number of choices
that pupils have in each school. If all the
pupils in a school have that school as their
only option, then the school is
‘monopolistic’, rather than competitive.
But if, on average, pupils in a school have
lots of alternatives, then the school has to
compete with those other schools to
attract its pupils.
Ideally, we need to look at differences
in choice and competition that vary
according to where a family lives and
where schools are located; but we do not
want to consider differences that are the
result of the choices parents make about
which school to attend or which school to
live close to.
We isolate this by looking closely at
local education authority (LEA) boundaries.
This is because, for the years in our data,
LEA boundaries imposed important
institutional restrictions on parental choice:
families were allowed to apply to schools
in LEAs other than their LEA of residence,
but in practice primary school pupils rarely
crossed LEA boundaries to go to school.
This is probably because parents felt that
banking on admission outside their own
LEA was a high-risk strategy: they had to
make separate applications to each LEA
and may have doubted that they would be
given the same priority as pupils who lived
in the same LEA as the school.
Indeed, it turns out that, in our study
area, only 4.7% of community school
pupils attend schools outside their home
LEA. The highest rate of LEA crossing is for
pupils in ‘voluntary aided’ schools
(predominantly faith schools), but this is
still only about 10%.
Because families living near LEA
boundaries generally do not cross to
neighbouring LEAs, they face longer
journeys than families in the interior of an
LEA to reach the same number of schools.
And since travel is costly, they face a more
restricted set of choices and are more
likely to send their children to nearby
schools inside their own LEA. In turn,
schools near to LEA boundaries face less
competition because they do not have to
compete with so many other schools for
this pool of pupils.
In short, the nearer a pupil lives to the
LEA boundary, the less choice they will
have, and the nearer a school is to the LEA
boundary, the less competition it will face.
If more competition and choice improve
the rate at which a pupil progresses at
school, then we would expect to see lower
attainment among pupils living and
attending school near LEA boundaries than
among pupils living centrally. We can use
this relationship to determine whether
competition and choice really make a
difference.
The link between
competition and performance
in primary schools
Is there really any difference in the number
of choices that pupils have (according to
our definition) and do schools in different
locations really face varying degrees of
competition? The number of school
choices available to families certainly
differs from place to place. On average,
apart from their own school, every child
has one to two schools they could have
gone to instead. Very few children have
more than three local alternatives. But one
in four pupils have no other schools within
a reasonable travel distance.
These differences show up as variation
in the level of competition faced by
different schools. This can be seen in
Figure 1, which maps our competition
index over the London area.
Some schools (those located in the
darkest shaded areas) have as many as
seven competitor schools. But many others
(those located in the unshaded areas)
appear to be completely monopolistic in
the sense that there are no local
alternatives for their pupils: our detailed
analysis shows that this is the case for one
in every ten schools.
The map shows that this variation is
only partly related to urban centrality and
density. Some of the highest values of our
competition index occur in suburban
districts such as Barnet and Brent, while
schools in some inner city areas like south
Hackney or Southwark face little
competition from each other.
Our first question is whether this
variation in any way affects a child’s
progress at primary school. As a measure
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In general, greater
competition arising
from more parental
choice does not boost
the performance of
primary schools
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of academic progress, we use the standard
‘value-added’ scores collected by the
Department for Education and Skills to
track pupil and school performance in the
primary years.
It turns out that there is indeed a
positive correlation between the
competition that a school faces from other
schools, and the rate at which pupils at
that school progress. In contrast, the
number of choices that parents have at
their home address is unrelated to their
children’s rate of progress.
Taken at face value, this indicates
small but significant gains for pupils in
schools facing more competition, but no
individual gains from being offered more
school choices. But when we look instead
at differences between pupils living close
to and far away from LEA boundaries, the
picture is quite different. Schools close to
LEA boundaries where the market is less
competitive actually perform slightly better
than schools further away from the
boundary – the implication being that
greater competition tends to reduce
school performance (see Table 1).
Using this approach, we find that an
increase of one additional competitor
school reduces average pupil progress by
about half a term (5-6 weeks) between
the ages of 7 and 11. But we do not have
very precise estimates and cannot rule out
the possibility that there is simply no
relationship at all between competition
and performance. If we look at the
number of school choices available to
parents using this method, we again find
no measurable impact on their children’s
personal attainment at school.
Autonomy, urban density and
school performance
Perhaps the reason we find little real
positive benefit from competition is
because the mechanisms to make it work
are just not in place: schools must have the
right incentives to respond if competition is
to be effective in raising standards.
While all state schools in England are
funded according to the number of pupils
on the roll, and headteachers’ pay is
linked to performance (both going some
way towards providing the right
incentives), admissions policy and
autonomy from LEA control also play a
role. What usually happens is that a
central LEA admissions team simply
reallocates pupils from popular,
oversubscribed schools to unpopular
schools, preventing competitive incentives
from operating.
Some schools are, however, quite
independent of LEA influence and control
their admissions – especially faith schools
and others classed as voluntary aided. In
these schools, the religious or charitable
institution that owns the school premises
has a majority representation on the
governing body and a strong influence over
its running; the governing body is also the
admissions authority. In community schools,
governance is shared more equally among
LEA representatives, teaching staff and
parents, and admissions are controlled by
the LEA. Perhaps the place to look for
competition effects is among schools in the
voluntary aided sector.
In this sector, we do find some
evidence that competition is positively
related to performance. For voluntary aided
schools, one additional competitor is linked
to a 1.6 point increase in the average pupil
value-added at a school, or 16-19 weeks
of progress in one of the core subjects,
between the ages of 7 and 11. Then
again, this estimate is quite imprecise and
Table 1:
Summarising the effects of parental choice and school
competition on pupil attainment
Age 7-11
progress in
community
primary schools
Age 7-11
progress in
voluntary aided
primary schools
Index of pupil
diversity in
ability in primary
schools (Gini)
Age 11-16
progress in
secondary
schools
Number of 
choices a pupil
has from home
No relationship No relationship – –
Competition 
from one
additional school
Reduces pupil
progress by 0.9 
value-added 
points
Increases pupil
progress by 1.6
value-added 
points
Reduces ability
diversity index by
0.3% to 0.4%
Small positive
impact
Figure 1:
Primary school competition in the Greater London area
Note: This figure maps the local average of the school-level competition index described in the
text. A school in the unshaded areas has none or just one competitor school. A school in the
darkest shaded areas has six or seven competitor schools. Each level of shading represents a
one-school interval in the competition index between these two limits.
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does not suggest a particularly strong link
between competition and performance.
We have also used an alternative
strategy to uncover the possible effects
from competition on secondary school
attainments. In this work, we look more
generally at how urban density affects
pupil test results.
The impression that most people have is
that schools in densely populated inner-urban
areas offer a poor education. In fact, by
looking at the changes in academic
achievement that take place after pupils
move from primary school to secondary
school, we show that density is a good thing.
Pupils perform slightly better when they are
at school in places that are highly urbanised
and – particularly importantly – where there
are many other neighbouring schools.
There are many possible explanations for
the stronger performance of pupils in dense
school markets, but a strong candidate is
greater inter-school competition among
secondary schools located close together in
more urban settings. 
The link between
competition and segregation
in primary schools
So greater competition arising from more
parental choice does not seem to boost
performance among primary schools
generally. But it may be effective among
some autonomous primary schools and
among secondary schools.
Critics of choice-based reforms point
to their potential costs in terms of
increased inequality between schools. They
argue that better-off parents are more
able to make good decisions about school
quality and to get what they want from
the admissions authorities, as well as
being less constrained by transport costs.
The main concern here is not just that
schools become segregated in terms of
pupils’ ethnicity or income, but also that
academically able and less able children
become segregated into different schools.
This means that some schools and pupils
could lose out because of the additional
difficulties and resource costs involved in
teaching lower ability groups.
One key question is whether the
potential gains in performance we find in
a minority of schools are accompanied by
wider inequalities. We can answer this
question within the same framework we
used when looking at pupil attainment in
primary schools, but now asking whether
schools facing high levels of competition
draw in pupils with a narrower range of
abilities than more monopolistic schools.
To measure the diversity of abilities
within a school, we use one of many
standard indices of inequality between
individuals. The index we choose in our
work on segregation is the Gini index,
calculated on pupil test results at the ages
of 7 and 11. The test results at the earlier
age mainly capture intake differences,
whereas results at the age of 11 also
reflect influences during the primary
school years.
The key point is that if competitive
schools are more educationally segregated,
they will have lower pupil Gini indices than
non-competitive schools. This is exactly
what we find, although our estimates are
not so precise that we can be completely
confident of our conclusions: schools
located near LEA boundaries where there is
less choice and which therefore face less
competition tend to have pupils with a
wider range of abilities; this is true at the
ages of both 7 and 11.
Although not precisely estimated, the
possible effects of competition on ability
segregation are very large. The average
school that enrols pupils who have no
other feasible alternatives has a diversity
index of around 0.41. By contrast, a highly
competitive school enrolling pupils with as
many as eight alternative choices would
have a diversity index of just 0.25. 
The effects of expanding
choice
Choice and competition have been at the
centre of recent policy debates on how to
improve educational standards. But as it
stands, according to our research, pupils
with many primary schools close to home
do no better than pupils who have few
local schools. So either families are not
exercising the choice that they have or
they are making choices that do not offer
any academic benefits.
On the other hand, our research
provides some support for the view that
policy intervention to introduce market
mechanisms as a means of stimulating
inter-school competition and innovation
may work to boost pupil achievements.
Although there seem to be no general
benefits from competition at the primary
level – it seems weakly linked to worse
performance – we do find some evidence
that schools running their own admission
systems and characterised by more
autonomous governance structures 
have higher educational standards in 
more competitive markets. And pupils do
seem to do better if their secondary school
is in an urban environment and not
geographically isolated from other schools.
On the downside, we have also
uncovered evidence that school
competition increases inequality, with high-
and low-ability pupils more segregated in
schools that face more competition. This
suggests that whatever performance
advantages it offers, further expansion of
market mechanisms in education may come
at the cost of increased social polarisation.
This article summarises a series of research
papers, including: ‘Choice, Competition and
Pupil Achievement’ by Stephen Gibbons,
Stephen Machin and Olmo Silva, Discussion
Paper No. 56 from the Centre for the
Economics of Education (CEE) at CEP
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/cee%20dps/ceedp56.pdf);
‘Competition and Accessibility in School
Markets: Empirical Analysis Using Boundary
Discontinuities’ by Stephen Gibbons and
Olmo Silva, in Improving School
Accountability: Check-ups or Choice edited
by Timothy Gronberg and Dennis Jansen
(Elsevier); and ‘Urban Density and Pupil
Attainment’ by Stephen Gibbons and Olmo
Silva, mimeo, CEP.
Stephen Gibbons, Stephen Machin and
Olmo Silva are all CEE researchers and active
members of CEP’s wider research programme
on education and skills.
Market mechanisms in
education may come at
the cost of increased
social polarisation
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Britain’s minimum wage:
what impact on pay and jobs?
A century has passed since the first call for a British
national minimum wage. In a remarkable 1906 Fabian
tract, WS Sanders anticipated almost all of today’s debates.
He analysed: how the wage should be set, arguing it
should provide subsistence for a family with three children;
its likely coverage – around 6% of workers; whether
employment would fall or rise once the minimum was set;
the need for a thorough inspection and enforcement
regime; the interaction between the proposed minimum
wage and the social security system or Poor Law
arrangements; and the distinction between the minimum
wage and a ‘living wage’.
But the tract was also a creature of its time. It advocated a
lower minimum wage for women than for men. Sanders
also had salty views on Chinese workers and Jewish
immigrants, writing of the ‘cunning of the yellow man’
and how ‘the Jew overcrowds whole districts with his habit
of living in misery’.
The British national minimum wage was finally introduced
in 1999. It has had a profound impact on pay:
■ When it was first introduced, it gave over one million
workers an average pay rise of 10-15%.
■ Since then it has been uprated seven times. It is now
£5.35 per hour. If it had simply been indexed to prices
since 1999, it would now be just £4. So the real pay of
those at the bottom of the wage league table has been
given a huge boost.
■ This, in turn, reversed the trend in the 1980s and 1990s
towards greater wage inequality.
■ The minimum wage has also narrowed the pay gap
between women and men. In 1998 – before the
minimum wage – the gap in average hourly wages was
17.4%. It is now only 13%.
■ Now, two million workers directly benefit from the
minimum wage, around one worker in ten.
When the minimum wage was being discussed in the
1990s, there were dire warnings that it would lower
employment. For example, Alan Walters – Mrs Thatcher’s
economic guru – wrote that it was ‘utter nonsense’ to
argue that jobs might not be lost.
Perhaps this hostility was unsurprising. Orthodox economic
theory predicts job losses, the scale depending on how
high the minimum wage is set and the ‘elasticity’ (or
sensitivity) of employment with respect to the wage.
But more subtle observers suggested that the labour
market – especially the low wage sectors – may not mirror
the economists’ competitive ideal. In particular, labour
market frictions – imperfect information, the costs of
switching between firms and the rich variety of workers’
preferences – mean that employers have considerable
discretion in wage setting. Under these circumstances, a
carefully set minimum wage would not necessarily cost
jobs and may even boost employment as recruits are found
for previously hard-to-fill vacancies.
This issue of the association between the minimum wage
and employment is one of the most contentious in
economics. But we now have evidence from over 25 British
studies so we no longer need to rely on our prejudices. The
conclusions are clear-cut – the minimum wage has not had
an adverse impact on jobs:
■ Aggregate employment has continued its upward trend
so that there are now over 30 million jobs in the
economy.
■ The share of total employment accounted for by the low
paying sectors – retail, hospitality, cleaning, agriculture,
security, textiles, clothing, hairdressing – is 26%,
identical to the share when the minimum wage was
introduced.
■ Tracking individual workers affected by the
minimum wage, and comparing them with a
control group of otherwise similar workers,
in brief...
The national minimum wage is now an established part of
the British labour market. In the first evaluation of all the
evidence of its impact on pay and jobs, David Metcalf
shows that there has been a big boost in the pay of those
towards the bottom of the pay league table with no
associated loss of jobs.
The minimum wage has not cost
jobs either in the aggregate
economy or in the low wage
industries and occupations
shows no differences between the groups in their
employment rates.
■ The minimum wage has greater bite and coverage in a
low wage county like Lincolnshire than in high wage
Surrey. But there is no evidence of lower employment
growth in the ‘low wage, high impact’ counties.
■ Those workplaces with a high fraction of low wage
workers in 1998 have had similar employment growth
to workplaces with just a few, or no, low paid
employees. Although there is a hint of some job losses
in the care home sector, this may reflect previous
overcapacity rather than the minimum wage.
The consensus is that the minimum wage has not cost
jobs, either in the aggregate economy or in the low wage
industries and occupations.
So, traditional economic theory predicts job losses but they
have not happened. Why? I have examined nine possible
explanations. Some can be dismissed but others are very
plausible. We can probably dismiss the following:
■ Was the minimum wage set too low? No: the evidence
shows that it has greatly advanced the position of the
low paid.
■ Is there incomplete coverage with workers gravitating to
low wage jobs in sectors that are not covered by the
minimum wage? No: the minimum wage applies to
virtually all workers.
■ Have employers cut back on fringe benefits like
subsidised meals or pensions to fund the minimum
wage? Probably not: it is high wage workers who get
these fringe benefits, not the low paid.
■ Will the employment losses only show up in the future?
Probably not: many of the studies look at data over a
relatively long run of years. Anyway, it is almost
impossible to pinpoint the labour market impact of a
wage increase some years ago because so many other
factors – extra holidays, hours restrictions, energy costs,
etc. – come into play.
■ Might the large rises in the minimum wage since 2002
have a bigger impact on jobs than before? Possibly: but
a careful quantitative study of the 2003 and 2004
upratings again shows no employment effects.
It is the next four items that hold the key to the lack of any
impact on jobs:
■ The employer has much more discretion in setting the
wage than orthodox economic theory admits. In
particular, where firms were making good profits from
paying low wages prior to the minimum wage, now
these excess profits are moderated and channelled back
to low paid workers. In such firms, profits rather than
jobs took the strain.
■ Although the studies I have surveyed show no
employment effects, there is some suggestion of modest
cuts in hours.
■ There is evidence of illegal collusion between some
employers and workers so that both gain at the expense
of the state. The employer pays below the minimum
wage but understates true hours. This permits the
worker to get a larger tax credit, the top-up payment
designed to ‘make work pay’. There is evidence of this in
some Bangladeshi restaurants and Indian clothing
manufacturers.
■ Incomplete compliance with the minimum wage,
particularly among the immigrant communities. My own
research on the Chinese labour market in London
covering restaurants, health shops, food manufacture
and distribution and clothing, concluded that not a
single worker below the level of chef or shop manager
was receiving the minimum wage.
Compliance depends on the probability of being caught
and the penalty for non-compliance. Frankly it is amazing
that so many employers do comply with the minimum
wage. A typical employer will get inspected once every 330
years. And if the employer is caught not complying he
simply pays back the arrears: there is no other penalty.
Note that one unintended and favourable side effect of
this non-compliance (and of illegal collusion between
employers and workers) is higher employment in the non-
complying sector. For example, the Chinese restaurant and
health care sectors are fiercely competitive and some
restaurants and shops would close if the minimum wage
were fully enforced.
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David Metcalf is professor of industrial relations at LSE, a
member of the Low Pay Commission and a research associate
in CEP’s labour markets programme.
This article summarises his December 2006 paper 
‘On the Impact of the British National Minimum Wage 
on Pay and Employment’
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/research/labour/minimumwage/
WP1481c.pdf).
Part of the explanation for the
absence of job losses is incomplete
compliance with the minimum wage
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location of economic activity. Figure 1
illustrates the historical record of shares of
world GDP for different regions. In
essence, there have been four phases: the
initial dominance of Asia; followed by the
rapid growth of Europe during and after
the industrial revolution; then the
subsequent rise of North America; and
now the resurgence of Asia.
Part of the change is due to
population, but much the larger part is
due to changes in per capita income – the
‘great divergence’, which saw the ratio of
per capita incomes of the richest to
poorest nations increase from 8:1 in 1870
to more than 50:1 in 2000. 
Economic geography has changed at
all spatial scales – not just aggregate
regions, but also within regions and
countries. The most important sub-
national change is urbanisation with a
majority of people now living in cities.
China alone expects a doubling of its
urban population to nearly one billion
people by 2030.
This sketch describes some of the
forces driving change in the world
economy, and some of the ensuing
changes in economic geography. It also
challenges our understanding of the
location of economic activity and the
determinants of changes in the pattern of
location.
The key questions
The first question is: why are economic
activity and prosperity spread so unevenly?
Is an American really 50 or 100 times
more productive than an Ethiopian? Even
within the UK, why are a Londoner’s
earnings 70% higher than those of
someone from Stoke?
Standard economic theory suggests
that while differences may arise as some
countries or regions gain initial advantage,
they should be rapidly arbitraged away.
Capital will flow to where labour is cheap,
and knowledge and new technologies will
be transferred. Fundamentally, if there are
diminishing returns to economic activities,
then there will be a continuing process of
convergence and a tendency for activity to
be spread relatively uniformly across space.
Yet these forces seem to operate in a
Shifts in 
economic 
geography
and their causes
R
ecent decades have
seen momentous
changes in the
economic geography
of the world. Political
transitions and
economic liberalisation have brought
formerly closed countries into the world
economy. In Richard Freeman’s phrase, this
amounts to a ‘doubling of the world
labour force’: the collapse of Soviet
communism adds 260 million workers, the
opening up of China 760 million, and
Indian liberalisation 440 million.
At the same time, technological
change has continued to reduce the cost
of interactions within and between
countries. Accompanying technological
innovation has been business innovation.
Multinational firms have expanded rapidly,
with foreign direct investment growing at
twice the rate of world trade, which itself
has grown at twice the rate of world
income. New forms of trade have emerged
with the growth of outsourcing and
production networks.
There have also been changes in the
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Why are economic activity and prosperity
spread so unevenly, and does globalisation
necessarily narrow these differences? 
Tony Venables outlines the key forces driving
the economic geography of cities, nations 
and the world economy – and how we should
think about future patterns of location for 
both developed and developing regions.
manner that is, at best, selective. Even
within reasonably well-functioning market
economies spatial disparities persist, and in
the wider world economy they are
astonishingly large.
The second question is: does increasing
trade necessarily narrow these differences?
The standard answer of international
economics is that price and income
differentials will narrow although
production structures may diverge. Yet
there have been many episodes in history
where falling transport costs and opening
to trade have been associated with
increasing differences between countries.
So the third question is: how should
we think about future developments, both
for developed and for developing regions?
We are currently in an era of globalisation
in which some economic activity is
dispersing from existing centres, but what
determines which sectors move and where
they go? Will prosperity be widely
dispersed or will some regions continue to
be left behind?
Answering these questions requires a
general theory of the location of economic
activity. This is not an area well served by
mainstream economic theory, which is
generally ‘aspatial’: the core theory of
international trade treats countries as
points with no spatial structure either
between or within them. In addition,
standard theory generally predicts
convergence of performance: differences
between regions arise because of
‘exogenous’ factors – differences in
endowments, institutions or technology –
and economic forces generally erode them
or at least do not amplify them.
New economic 
geography
‘New economic geography’ has worked
towards addressing these deficiencies. The
objective is to offer an integrated theory of
location, capable of explaining divergence
as well as convergence in economic
performance.
The key building block is the
recognition that proximity is good for
productivity: dense configurations of
economic activity work better than sparse
or fragmented ones. Mobile factors of
production – firms and possibly workers –
will locate in order to take advantage of
higher productivity, and this creates a
positive feedback. Firms and workers go
where productivity is high, and by so doingSource: Angus Maddison (2001)
Figure 1:
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tend to raise productivity further, creating
an uneven distribution of activity and
spatial income disparities.
There are several analytical challenges
here. One is to have sound theories and
evidence as to why proximity is good for
productivity. The second is to place the
proximity-productivity relationship in a
wider model and thereby identify the
trade-offs between forces for
concentration or dispersion of economic
activity. Then hypotheses can be formed
about circumstances in which activities may
concentrate or disperse, and about the
associated shifts in economic geography.
The next three sections discuss three
key propositions. First, that proximity to
other economic agents – workers,
consumers and firms – is good for
productivity. Second, that large income
disparities are a perfectly natural outcome
of a world in which proximity matters. And
third, that the effects of increased trade
are potentially ambiguous: there are
circumstances in which cheaper spatial
interactions cause inequality not
convergence.
Proximity and 
productivity
The first proposition is that proximity to
other people is good for productivity.
What is the evidence, and what are the
economic mechanisms that drive the
effect? There is a long list of mechanisms,
which fall under two headings: product
markets and labour markets. These
correspond loosely to different spatial
scales: some of the product market effects
might operate over long distances; while
labour market effects are short range,
even coming down to the benefits of face-
to-face contact.
Product markets
The most immediate effect of proximity is
that it saves transport and other trade
costs. Thus, if two producers have
identical physical productivity, the one
producing in the large market will have
higher productivity since it does not have
to bear the costs of transport to remote
consumers. This producer will also have
lower cost intermediate inputs, not having
to absorb its share of shipping costs on
these inputs.
But trade costs should be thought of
in much more general terms than just
freight charges. Time in transit is costly –
partly from the costs of carrying stock,
and also from the likelihood that long
transit times reduce the reliability and
predictability of deliveries. It also makes
firms slower to respond to changing
demand or cost levels, which by itself can
be a force for the clustering of activities
(see Harrigan and Venables, 2006). 
Transport and trade cost savings are a
direct benefit of proximity, but its full
economic impact comes from economies
of scale associated with operating in an
area of dense economic activity – close to
consumers, workers and other firms. In a
small or fragmented market, there is a
trade-off between having firms large
enough to achieve economies of scale
without becoming monopolists.
A large or integrated market shifts this
trade-off, allowing benefits of both large
scale and more intense competition. As a
consequence, firms will be larger,
operating at lower average cost and
setting lower prices. The more intense
competition will weed out less efficient
firms, concentrating production in efficient
firms. A larger market will also support a
greater variety of products. These price
and variety effects benefit consumers and,
if the goods are intermediates, benefit
firms in downstream sectors.
Labour markets
In addition to efficiency gains in the goods
market, firms also gain from operating in
a large labour market. The larger the pool
of workers that a firm can access, the
more likely it is to be able to find the exact
skills that suit its needs.
A large labour market will also
increase the incentives for workers to
undertake training. This argument turns
on increased intensity of competition. In a
small market, workers who acquire
specialist skills may be ‘held-up’ by
monopsonistic employers, so there is no
incentive for them to invest in skills. A
large number of potential employers
removes this threat of opportunistic
behaviour, and thereby increases training
incentives.
A further set of arguments has to do
with communication between workers. In
many activities, face-to-face contact is
extremely important, enabling higher
frequency interchange of ideas than is
possible by email, phone or
videoconference. Brainstorming is hard to
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that 
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good for
productivity
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do without the ability to interrupt and use
parallel means of communication – oral,
visual and body language.
Face-to-face contact is also important
for building trust. By breaking down
anonymity, it enables networks of the
most productive workers to develop, and
promotes partnerships and joint projects.
All these considerations are productivity
enhancing.
A final set of arguments concerns
‘knowledge spillovers’, which are easier
between proximate firms than remote
ones. The mechanism may be labour
mobility, face-to-face social contact
between workers or observation of the
practices of other firms. Such effects are
particularly important in innovation
intensive activities.
Location specific knowledge spillovers
also arise as firms learn about the
characteristics of their location, and this
knowledge spills over to other firms. This
may be learning about real economic
characteristics of locations, or may just be
‘herding’, as firms simply copy the location
decisions of other (successful) firms. All of
these knowledge spillover effects are
summarised in Alfred Marshall’s phrase:
‘the mysteries of the trade become no
mystery but are, as it were, in the air’.
Different scales of 
proximity effects
The various proximity effects operate over
quite different spatial scales. Product
market effects can be long range: firms in
New York may benefit from a large market
in California, and reductions in
international shipping costs will increase
market access for exporting firms. Labour
market effects operate within a much
narrower area – indeed, Rice et al (2006)
suggest that 45 minutes driving time is the
appropriate range for these effects.
Proximity effects also operate across
different sectoral scales. Some are driven
by aggregate demand: proximity to a mass
of consumers will cut trade costs and raise
demand for all firms whose sales, direct or
indirect, are concentrated in the area. All
such firms will appear to have higher
productivity near centres of high demand.
Other effects are narrowly sector specific:
for example, a film actor benefits from
proximity to a film producer but won’t
care much about aggregate demand in
Los Angeles.
The financial sector provides a good
example of these varying scales. Some of
its backroom activities can be easily
separated from the rest of the firm, and
operated from low cost locations. Other
parts of the business, such as retail
banking, require proximity to final
consumers. And the most skill intensive
parts of the sector are spectacularly prone
to clustering, valuing face-to-face
contacts, access to thick labour markets
and a dense network of firms offering
complementary services.
Similarly, within manufacturing, some
stages of the production process can be
outsourced and moved to low cost
locations. For other parts, this is not
possible, partly because of the costs of
breaking the production flow within the
firm and partly because of the loss of
proximity to complementary inputs, skilled
labour markets or consumers. 
The evidence for proximity effects
There are many sources of evidence for
the claim that proximity is good for
productivity. The most extensively
researched is from studies of the
productivity of cities. Rosenthal and
Strange (2004) report a consensus view
that, over a wide range of city sizes,
doubling city size is associated with a
productivity increase of 3-8%. This is a
large effect: moving from a city of 50,000
inhabitants to one of five million is
predicted to increase productivity by more
than 50%.
In the international context, proximity
manifests itself in large trade flows – 
and the gains from trade are widely
documented. For example, Redding and
Venables (2004) focus on measuring
countries’ access to markets and sources
of supply, and find that a 1%
improvement in a country’s market access
– which has the effect of increasing its
exports by 1% – raises per capita income
by around 0.25%.
Equilibrium disparities
The second proposition is that large spatial
disparities in income can be a persistent
‘equilibrium’ outcome. To establish this,
the arguments about proximity need to be
combined with other forces to give a
theory of the location of economic 
activity, and consequent wage and 
income differentials.
The best way to do this is to think
about the profitability of a firm choosing
between various production sites. How do
its potential profits vary across alternative
locations? They depend on three
elements: productivity, defined broadly to
include the benefits of transport cost
savings; product market competition – the
number of competitors that the firm will
face in its chosen location; and input
prices, including those of intermediate
goods and primary factors.
The equilibrium location of activity is
the arrangement of firms that causes
productivity levels, product market
competition and input prices to adjust
until all firms are indifferent about their
choice of location. 
Now what happens to the profits of
firms in a location when an additional firm
establishes operations in the same
location? If profits increase, then adding
this firm increases the incentives for
further firms to come, so there is an
agglomeration process, with differences
between locations becoming amplified. If
profits fall, then activity will be dispersed
and firms will tend to spread out.
Dense
configurations
of economic
activity work
better than
sparse or
fragmented
ones
CentrePiece Winter 2006/07
16
The proximity-productivity relationship
is an amplification force, since adding
firms raises productivity and profits of
existing firms. Product market competition
and input prices are dispersion forces:
adding another firm crowds the market,
thus reducing revenue, and bids up the
prices of immobile factors, raising costs. 
Equilibrium location is therefore a
balance between the proximity-
productivity relationship, a force that
amplifies initial differences, and product
market competition and factor cost forces,
which tend to dampen down effects.
First nature geography and
international wage differences
How do these forces interact? Consider
first the implications of exogenous
differences between countries, such as
institutional or policy differences or
differences in natural geography.
Geographers have a longstanding
distinction between ‘first nature
geography’ – coasts, mountain ranges,
natural endowments – and ‘second nature
geography’ – the geography of
interactions between economic agents.
There are the direct disadvantages of
bad first nature geography – for example,
propensity to disease lowers productivity
and being landlocked raises transport
costs – but what are the full equilibrium
effects? Advantages and disadvantages of
first nature geography become amplified,
as firms move into locations with good
geography, and the proximity-productivity
relationship causes further increases in
productivity, while countries with bad 
first nature geography will have low 
levels of economic activity, reducing
productivity further.
Who bears the costs and benefits of
these spatial variations in productivity?
They are borne entirely by immobile
factors, which in the international context
means labour. Since labour may be a small
share of the costs of production, there can
be a large multiplier effect. If labour is
10% of gross costs, then a 50% difference
in the productivity of all inputs will
translate into a 500% wage difference.
Such large effects are confirmed by
Gallup and Sachs (1999), who find that
70% of cross-country variation in per
capita income can be accounted for by
just four measures of physical and
economic geography: malaria,
hydrocarbon endowment, coastal access
and transport costs. 
Second nature geography and
economic agglomeration
The proximity-productivity relationship
does not just amplify economic differences
that arise because of exogenous factors. If
amplification effects are strong enough,
then they can create disparities between
locations that are identical in underlying
characteristics. Indeed, they are the driving
force behind the existence of cities, the
most commonplace manifestation of the
unevenness of economic activity.
A world with diminishing returns to
activity would have no cities, as activity
would be smeared across space. But the
proximity-productivity relationship is a force
for clustering all activity into a mega-city.
Pulling in the opposite direction are
dispersion forces: product market
competition, which means that some firms
remain dispersed to supply remote
consumers; and high urban prices of
immobile factors. If workers are free to
migrate within a country, then the only
immobile factor is land, the price of which
is bid up, thus also raising urban wages as
mobile workers are compensated for
regional variations in the cost of living.
Further dispersion forces may be provided
by urban congestion and commuting costs.
Notice that dispersion forces are
generally not sector specific but some
agglomeration forces are since the
proximity-productivity relationship can vary
between sectors. This gives rise to
sectorally specialised cities – London and
Hollywood – the size of which depends on
the importance of the sector in the world
or regional economy.
Trade, location and
inequality
The third proposition is that trade is not
necessarily a force for convergence of
incomes. The historical record shows that
nineteenth century globalisation was
associated with substantial divergence of
income between regions, and the impact
of twenty-first century globalisation 
on international inequality remains 
hotly debated.
The interactions between trade and
income divergence are complex, but the
basic ideas can be developed using the
stylised model of Krugman and Venables
(1995). This model has just two countries,
which have identical economic structures
and identical real wages when trade costs
are high. This is because when trade is
expensive, supply and demand in each
country’s product market – a dispersion
force – are dominant in determining the
location of activity. 
As trade costs fall, the possibility of
supplying consumers through trade rather
than local production develops, and the
proximity-productivity relationship
becomes relatively more important. Below
some level of trade costs, these forces
come to dominate, and one of the
countries gains most of the manufacturing
and the other is ‘deindustrialised’.
But as trade costs fall further, so the
clustering force becomes weaker, and
location comes to be determined by factor
prices, a dispersion force. This is the era of
globalisation, in which manufacturing
starts to move from developed to
developing countries and wages narrow.
Clearly, this model is highly stylised,
but it illustrates the complex role of trade
in determining the location of activity.
Trade changes the balance between the
Large income
disparities 
are a
perfectly
natural
outcome of 
a world in
which
proximity
matters
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dispersion forces of product and factor
market competition and the clustering
force of the proximity-productivity
relationship. The model provides the
apparatus to think through other shifts in
economic geography. 
Lumpy dispersion
So world economic geography can be
thought of as a balance between
concentration forces and dispersion 
forces. What light does this shed on
potential future changes in a globalising
world economy?
This question can be answered under
three headings. First, sectorally: which
activities are likely to remain concentrated
and which to disperse? Second, by
country: what might the cross-country
pattern of location look like, and how will
the international distribution of income
change? And third, sub-nationally: where
next for cities?
The running theme is that much
activity will move out of existing 
centres, but relocation will be ‘lumpy’,
benefiting some regions more than others
and re-coalescing into new patterns 
of agglomeration.
Which sectors move?
Which sectors are most likely to detach
from existing centres of activity and
relocate to lower wage regions? One
determinant is factor intensity: so, for
example, unskilled labour intensive
activities will tend to relocate to low
wage countries. But it is helpful to extend
this reasoning with a broader notion of
comparative advantage, encompassing a
variety of country characteristics,
including institutional quality and
business environment. Thus, countries
with good intellectual property protection
will tend to attract sectors that value this
protection, and so on.
Comparative advantage is only part
of the story. There is the ‘linkage’
intensity of the product: how easy is it to
detach the activity from its existing
location, and how expensive is loss of
proximity to related economic activities?
This depends on all the elements of the
proximity-productivity relationship. If
firms in a sector are highly dependent on
a network of suppliers or on capabilities
embodied in the local labour force, then
it is unlikely that the sector will relocate.
The strength of these interactions
varies across sectors and depends on the
costs of transport and other spatial
interactions. Thus, face-to-face contact
may be crucial for some economic
activities but not for others. Skills 
may be embodied in the labour force and
hard to transfer, or it may be very easy to
train workers in a new location. And
timely delivery may be crucial for some
goods: there is evidence that production
of fashion sensitive garments has 
moved back to high wage countries for
this reason.
The profitability of relocation also
depends on the extent to which the
production process can be ‘fragmented’
into different stages, with different factor
endowments and different linkages to
related activities. This is being studied in
a rapidly expanding research literature on
fragmentation, production networks,
outsourcing and offshoring (for example,
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006).
The argument is that globalisation has
created the possibility of a finer pattern of
specialisation as it is now possible to
locate different parts of the production
process in different countries. Component
parts and semi-finished goods can cross
borders multiple times, and countries are
able to engage in ‘vertical specialisation’,
producing just one very narrowly defined
part of a product.
This is an area where much more
research is needed. For high-income
countries, is it possible to identify
activities that are more or less likely to
become detached? We need to develop a
way of measuring whether a country has
a ‘deep’ or a ‘shallow’ comparative
advantage in a particular product or task.
For developing countries, which are
the sectors that are most footloose –
apparel, electronic assembly? And can we
diagnose why a labour intensive activity
might not be willing to move? What
exactly are the linkages that would be
forgone in moving out of an established
centre of activity, and how easily can they
grow in a developing country?
There are also a number of policy
issues. The proximity-productivity
relationship creates a coordination failure,
suggesting a role for national industrial
policy to act as a catalyst to overcome
the failure. Internationally, it should
influence the way we think about 
trade policy.
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The effects 
of increased
trade are
potentially
ambiguous:
cheaper
spatial
interactions
can cause
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not
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Once again, this points to the
importance of policy. Bad policy
environments can ensure that a country
is left out. Creating a good business
environment, institutionally and in terms
of infrastructure provision, is essential.
The role of pro-active industrial policy
remains intensely controversial.
Spatial concentration: 
regions and cities
Finally, what shifts in economic
geography are occurring within
countries? High-income countries have
an established city structure, but are
nevertheless witnessing some changes.
After decades of decline, cities are
undergoing a renaissance as more
knowledge-based activities seek to
benefit from clustering.
The situation is more fluid in
developing countries, experiencing 
rapid structural change and migration.
Spatial inequality tends to increase
during development, often arising from
spatial concentration in manufacturing.
For example, states in southern India
have come to prominence in
manufacturing, and Mexican
manufacturing has concentrated in
regions on the US border, leading to
large increases in spatial variation of 
per capita incomes. 
While increasing spatial disparities
are a problem for some developing
countries, managing the process of
urbanisation is a problem for almost all
of them. The number of cities in the
world with a population of more than
one million went from 115 in 1960 to
416 in 2000; for cities of more than four
million, the increase was from 18 to 53;
and for those with more than 12 million,
from one to 11. This indicates that,
despite the massive diseconomies
associated with developing country
mega-cities, there are even more
powerful economies of scale, making 
it worthwhile for firms to locate in 
these cities.
This creates another major policy
challenge. Mega-cities may expand far
beyond their efficient scale, but the
clustering forces make it difficult for new
urban areas to compete and become
established. There is a case for policy
intervention to decentralise activity, but
we remain woefully ignorant about what
works and what doesn’t.
Where will production go?
Turning to countries, what pattern of
development is predicted? The
fundamental point from the theory is
that simultaneous development of
similar countries is likely to be unstable.
For example, suppose that activity is
relocating from an established centre
into two similar emerging economies,
and that proximity-productivity
relationships operate in the sectors
concerned. Then whichever country gets
slightly ahead will have higher
productivity and become the more
attractive location for further
investment, while the other country will
fall behind.
This observation has a number of
implications. First, we should expect
growth and development to occur in
sequence, not in parallel. Instead of all
poor countries steadily converging to
high-income status, there is an inherent
unevenness. Some countries will grow
extremely fast while others will be left
out of the process.
Which countries go first? Many
factors count, including first nature
geography and the institutional and
policy environment. The models predict
that economic development will spread
out from existing centres, going to
regions with low transport costs, such as
the coastal regions of neighbouring
countries. This is a view of the world that
fits well with recent growth patterns in
Asia as compared with Africa.
While this aggregate view is
important, the phenomenon is seen even
more sharply at the sectoral level. As
sectors migrate from established centres
of activity, so their new location pattern
exhibits clustering. A striking feature of
growth has been the fact that many
countries have done well in a few
extremely narrow product segments,
such as India’s software industry and
Bangladesh’s success in exporting shirts,
trousers and hats to the United States,
while Pakistan does well in bed linen
and footballs.
So the story is that sectors will
relocate, but that this relocation will be
‘lumpy’, sectorally and in aggregate,
with some countries being left out. A
corollary of this is that small initial
differences – the factors that first attract
a sector to a country – will generate
large differences in outcomes.
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Conclusions
There are many reasons for variation in the
prosperity of countries and regions. Some
factors are truly exogenous – first nature
geography – and others are a function 
of political and institutional history. On 
top of these exogenous factors, we need
to place a theory of the location of
economic activity.
International trade theory gets us part
of the way, and the new economic
geography approach broadens this out to
capture (in a micro-founded and evidence-
based way) ‘endogenous’ variations in
productivity. The approach offers an
explanation of the emergence of
disparities between countries and regions
– and of their persistence.
It suggests that even as globalisation
causes dispersion of activity, so economic
development will be in sequence, not in
parallel: some countries will experience
rapid growth while others will be left
behind. At the micro-level, it points to the
importance of overcoming coordination
failures and threshold effects in growing
new cities and in establishing new
industries in developing economies.
This is an edited version of ‘Shifts in
Economic Geography and their Causes’ 
by Anthony J Venables, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 767 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0767.pdf). The paper was originally
prepared for the symposium on ‘The New
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Implications’, sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, 24-26 August 2006
(http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/
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Bosnia: the labour market 
costs of conflict
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a former territory of 
ex-Yugoslavia, which became independent with the fall of
the regime in 1992. Shortly after independence was
declared, conflict broke out between the three main ethnic
groups living in the territory, the Serbs against the Croats
and the Bosnians. 
In 1995, shortly after the Srebrenica massacre, which took
place in July, the Dayton agreement marked the end of the
armed conflict, and initiated the partitioning of the country
into two distinct entities: the Bosnian and Croat-led
Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Serb-led
Republika Srpska. Each entity makes up roughly a half of
the total territory.
The most conservative estimate of the total number of
casualties of the Bosnian war is 102,000. The number of
people displaced by the conflict is estimated at about 1.3
million (in exile or internally displaced). Between 1996 and
2004, over one million of the internally displaced ‘resettled'
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of the displaced Bosnians
resettled in the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina, whereas
most of the displaced Serbs chose the Republika Srpska.
My research examines the impact of this conflict-induced
migration on the labour market status of displaced people
after they permanently resettled in Bosnia and Herzegovina
– their propensity to be employed, unemployed or inactive
(that is, not in education and neither working nor looking
for work). 
The labour market in Bosnia Herzegovina mainly consists of
unregulated jobs – often referred to as the informal sector.
Workers in this sector do not usually have access to health
and unemployment insurance, and they cannot rely on
other institutional amenities. Moreover, job opportunities in
the sector are rarely made public since small-scale
employers tend to rely on informal networks to find
suitable candidates. As the population of displaced people
resettles within the country, I argue that they are likely to
have reduced access to those informal networks. They are
hence less likely to find employment or even engage in
fruitful job-search activity.
I focus on the labour market outcomes of displaced people
aged between 18 and 64, using data from the first post-
war household survey in Bosnia, which was collected
annually between 2001 and 2004, visiting the same
households each year. Observing the labour market
characteristics of the same people at different points in
time makes it possible to estimate the impact of
displacement on labour market status more accurately.
So what does the analysis reveal? First, I look at the
average effect of displacement on labour market outcomes
over the period 2001-4. Overall, displaced Bosnians are
faring worse in terms of employment than their ‘stayer’
counterparts, although there is no evidence of such an
effect for displaced Serbs. For Serbian women, there is no
significant effect of displacement on work or inactivity,
although there is a positive and significant effect on
unemployment. There is also a significant effect of
displacement on Serbian women's hours and hourly
wages, suggesting that employed displaced Serbian
women work shorter hours and earn less than their stayer
counterparts.
These results are in line with the idea that labour market
outcomes of displaced people are worse than those of
stayers. Moreover, the fact that, despite higher levels of
worklessness, the displaced tend not to
experience higher levels of inactivity lends
some support to the idea that they cannot
‘afford' idleness.
The last issue of CentrePiece reported research by Florence
Kondylis on the costs of conflict-induced migration for
individual households in Rwanda. In this issue, she explores
similar questions for people displaced and resettled as a result
of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
in brief...
People displaced by the Bosnian
war are faring worse in the
labour market than their 
‘stayer’ counterparts
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Looking at patterns of assimilation back into the labour
market over time, I find that these vary along ethnic and
gender lines. On returning, displaced Bosnian men
experience significantly lower levels of employment as well
as higher levels of unemployment and inactivity. As they
gain in seniority, there is no evidence that they transit into
employment, although they may transit out of inactivity
and into unemployment. For displaced Serbian men, there
seems to be little change over time.
Bosnian women are more likely to be workless on
returning, but they tend to catch up with their stayer
counterparts over time. This is very much in line with the
results for Bosnian men. Serbian women are initially more
likely to be inactive and less likely to be unemployed, but
the differentials are reduced over time. There is no
evidence of an increase in their employment over time. 
Those results are particularly relevant in the context of
conflict resolution and economic intervention. Overall,
displaced people are faring worse, on returning, than their
stayer counterparts, but Bosnians more so than Serbs. 
This is of particular concern in terms of crisis
management, as they are likely to experience highly
precarious conditions, which might put their
and their children's livelihood at risk.
Although there is some evidence of
assimilation into the labour market
over time, most groups still
find it difficult to find a
job, and merely transit from
inactivity into unemployment.
High levels of informality in the labour
market are likely to make it harder for the
returning displaced to find, or even search,
for some work.
Moreover, as those people are likely to have no wealth
and no access to credit, they are less likely to react to the
lack of opportunities for paid employment by setting up
their own businesses. Credit interventions targeting
people willing to be entrepreneurial might be a valuable
avenue for policy-makers to pursue.
Bosnians are not
doing as well 
as Serbs in 
getting back into
employment
This article summarises
‘Conflict-induced
Displacement and Labour
Market Outcomes: Evidence
from Post-war Bosnia and
Herzegovina’ by 
Florence Kondylis, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 777
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0777.pdf).
Florence Kondylis is a
postdoctoral fellow at the 
Earth Institute at Columbia
University and a former
research economist at CEP.
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Over the past decade or so, there has been a
fundamental change in what the managers of
Japanese companies believe are their key
objectives. Ronald Dore traces the country’s
conversion to Anglo-Saxon capitalism – and
growing concerns about the emergence of a
new ‘divided society’.
Japan’s 
shareholder
revolution
‘E
conomic reform’ has
been the banner
slogan of Japanese
governments for the
last ten years, and the
new government promises more of it. For
prime minister Shinzo Abe, it is not quite
the strident claim to fearless determination
that it was for his predecessor. In his initial
policy speech, he used the word ‘reform’ –
kaikaku – only 17 times; Junichiro
Koizumi’s first speech used it 37 times. Nor
was he as fond of the ponderous
elaboration ‘structural reform’, which
Koizumi used 17 times and Abe only once.
But there is no doubt about the
general direction of economic institutional
change: Abe’s chief cabinet secretary is a
dedicated neo-liberal, and the appointment
of renowned market fundamentalists as
academic members of his economic council
is a clear sign of which way some of the
longstanding controversial issues are likely
to be resolved. Expect tax reforms to make
it easier for foreign firms to take over
Japanese firms, for example.
What have they all amounted to, these
ten years of deregulation, privatisation,
intensification of competition, rethinking
welfare and flexibility in labour markets?
‘Trying hard but could do better’ – the
standard patronising judgement of the
Wall Street Journal and The Economist –
greatly understates the degree to which
the Japanese economy has in fact changed
since 1990.
Not that deliberate ‘reform’ has been
the major cause of change. Deregulation
has brought greater competition and lower
consumer prices in a few marginal areas
like airlines and petrol distribution (thus,
incidentally, contributing to the deflation
that has stifled the Japanese economy over
the last decade). But that has nothing to
do with the big change, the ‘shareholder
revolution’, the fundamental shift in what
managers consider their job to be.
Back in the 1980s, when US business
schools held up Japanese management as
a model of long-termism and worker
commitment, what managers saw as the
best measure of their success, what puffed
them with pride or made them
despondent, was their market share – the
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measure of how they were doing vis-à-vis
their competitors at home and abroad.
They sought profits of course, but
chiefly as free cash for investment. How
far they would allow increases in pay to
eat into potential profits was primarily a
‘jam today or jam tomorrow’ question.
Shareholders were in fact treated as
creditors, and dividends were a kind of
fixed charge, a standard percentage of 
the face value of their shares. The
enterprise was a quasi-community and top
managers were its elders. Their pay
increases kept pace with those of people
on the shop floor.
Today’s Japanese managers have been
‘Anglo-Saxonised’. It is not market share,
but the price of their shares in the stock
market that has become their central
measure of how well they are doing. Few
top managers any longer bother attending
meetings of the management-union
consultation committee, which used to be
a central enterprise institution. They are
too busy preparing for their next visit to
Wall Street or the City of London, or the
next meeting with analysts. (The Security
Analysts Association of Japan, which had
a mere 1,000 members when it instituted
its professional examination in 1981, now
boasts 21,000 qualified members.)
Different objectives lead to different
results, especially in terms of ‘who gets
what’. This is evident in data on company
performance from the Japanese ministry
of finance, which has a very detailed
statistical series for non-financial
corporations based on a 100%
sample of corporations with paid-up
capital of more than one billion yen.
These numbered around 3,000 in
the mid-1980s, 5,600 now.
As Table 1 shows, the contrast
between Japan’s last two periods of
recovery from recession – the late 1980s
and the first years of this century – is
stark. The Plaza agreement and a 60%
yen revaluation plunged the
Japanese economy into recession
in 1986. In the five years of
recovery that followed (what
turned out to be the fatal five
years of the asset price bubble),
these large corporations – employing
about a tenth of the private sector work
force – gave most of the proceeds from
growth to their employees. Wages (plus
fringe benefits) went up by 19% while
dividends increased by just 2%.
During the recent, much slower,
recovery, between 2001 and 2005, wages
did not go up but down, by 6%, and
dividends went up by 175%. (Mild
inflation in the first period and mild
deflation in the second period affect the
Realisation of the extent 
of Japan’s shareholder
revolution is slowly sinking in
– and alarm bells are ringing
Percentage change Percentage change 
between 1986 between 2001
and 1990 and 2005
Sales per firm 5.5% 4.9%
Value added per firm 6.8% 7.9%
Wages/fringe benefits per employee 19.1% -5.8%
Salaries and bonuses of directors, per director 22.2% 97.3%
Profits per firm 28.4% 90.0%
Dividends per firm 1.6% 174.8%
Cumulated additions to reserves/cumulated dividends over five years 1.78 0.31
Source: Japanese ministry of finance
Table 1:
Comparing Japan’s two most recent recoveries from recession
True believers in shareholder
value have become the
dominant voice in Japanese
boardrooms and ministries
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real wage implications of those figures,
but not their ratios.) 
As for ‘orientation to the long term’,
in the first period, companies put into
reserves for investment 80% more than
they paid out in dividends; in the second
period 70% less.
Perhaps even more striking is the
erosion of the key assumption of the
quasi-community – that managers and
employees ‘eat their rice out of the same
pot’. In the first period, while wages rose
by 19%, directors’ salaries plus bonuses
rose by 22%. In the last five years, while
wages have gone down by 6%, directors’
salaries and bonuses have gone up by
97% – and that does not count the stock
options, which became legal a decade
ago and have progressively increased
since.
One is reminded of the 1980s in the
United States, the decade of the demise
of the Japanese-style community firms like
Kodak and IBM. There too, shareholder
activism and the spiralling of executive
pay went hand in hand.
There are both rational and
ideological elements in the explanation of
these changes. In the 1980s, the
expectation of everlasting capital gains
kept shareholders so happy that stock
prices bubbled, even with minimal
dividends. Now they want income, and
forcefully vocal foreign institutional
investors now hold 26% of Japanese
stock, compared with 5% in 1990. The
network of mutual cross-shareholdings,
the preponderance of ‘stable
shareholders’ that used to provide a firm
guarantee against hostile takeovers has
been largely dismantled, partly because of
bank distress, partly engineered by
government regulation. Firms are no
longer protected against hostile takeover. 
But the ideological element is
probably greater. The total loss of national
self-confidence after the world’s number
one economic miracle entered its ‘lost
decade’ coincided with two important
changes.
First, seniority promotion has brought
to positions of influence a cohort of
people whom I rudely call ‘the brain-
washed generation’. These are the high-
flyers sent by ministries and companies to
the United States for MBAs and PhDs in
the 1970s and 1980s. These true believers
in agency theory and shareholder value
have become the dominant voice in
ministries and boardrooms, backed up by
the media and by the economists and
corporation law experts who sit on
government committees.
The second big change is the
evaporation of the Socialist Party and the
emasculation of the enterprise unions
once affiliated to it. The organised left is
now reduced to a tiny and dwindling
Communist Party, dull, doctrinaire and
excluded from mainstream politics.
Realisation of the extent of the
shareholder revolution is slowly sinking in,
and a few alarm bells are ringing. It is
becoming a truism that recovery is
painfully slow because the export boom
and a modest recovery in investment are
not being matched by increased consumer
spending or consumer confidence. And
that is because wages are not rising.
More striking is the new voice of what
one might call a new communitarian left
concerned with growing poverty. Books on
income distribution, social mobility and
the withering of aspiration pour off the
press at the rate of one a week, all
deploring the new ‘divided society’. That
28% of children in Osaka and 24% in
Tokyo qualify for free school meals and
textbooks has become one of the most
quoted statistics. Table 1 reports wage
figures for the ‘labour aristocracy’, people
working in the big firms. By contrast, in
smaller firms, which employ half
the labour force, wages fell
by 10%, not 6%. 
But as yet there is
no effective political
force to organise the
backlash and mobilise
sentiment among the
electorate at large.
Until that
happens,
investors can
relax. The Abe
cabinet will
continue to
promote the
conversion
of Japan to
Anglo-Saxon
capitalism.
The
different
objectives 
of today’s
Japanese
managers
lead to very
different
results –
especially 
in terms of
‘who gets
what’
Ronald Dore is a CEP research associate,
former professor of political science at MIT
and author of Stock Market Capitalism:
Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany
versus the Anglo-Saxons (Oxford University
Press, 2000). A version of this article appeared
in the Japan Times in November 2006.
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Fat city: does urban sprawl 
lead to human sprawl?
in brief...
The finding that people in
sprawling neighbourhoods are
heavier does not imply that
sprawl causes obesity
As health spending on obesity-related illnesses continues
to rise in the United States and parts of Europe including
the UK, many suggest that urban planning geared
towards active and healthy living could be an important
tool to curb obesity. 
But does urban sprawl really cause human sprawl? Not
according to research by CEP’s Henry Overman and
colleagues at the University of Toronto and the Universitat
Pompeu Fabra in Spain. Their recent study finds no
evidence that urban sprawl affects people’s weight. 
What the research does confirm is the commonly reported
view that people living in sprawling neighbourhoods tend
to be heavier than those living in neighbourhoods where
development is compact and there are plenty of shops
and amenities within walking distance. But this is not
because sprawling neighbourhoods cause people to gain
weight. Populations in sprawling neighbourhoods are
heavier because individuals with an innate propensity to
be obese tend to live in such neighbourhoods.  Thus
someone with an idiosyncratic distaste for walking is both
more likely to be obese and to prefer living where one can
easily get around by car. If this is the case, the finding that
people in sprawling neighbourhoods are heavier does not
imply that sprawl causes obesity.
To study the role of this sorting process, the researchers
matched recently available satellite images of the United
States to confidential survey data that reports the
weight and address of a sample of nearly 6,000
individuals for six years. Since approximately
80% of the people in the sample changed
residences during that period, the
researchers could check whether
people actually gained weight when
they moved to a more sprawling
neighbourhood. If sprawl causes
people to gain weight, then
people who move from compact to sprawling
neighbourhoods should gain weight. They don’t. This
means that plans to redesign the environment will not
lead to cities that cause people to be thin. Rather, they are
likely to create cities to which thin people move.
The results provide a basis for thinking that ‘smart growth’
type designs will not cause people to be thinner, so that
policy-makers who hope to combat the obesity epidemic
with these designs are wasting tax dollars. The public
health battle against obesity should be fought on other
fronts.
Other experts have hailed the research as significant in
fighting popular misconceptions about the causes of
obesity. Matthew Kahn, economics professor at Tufts
University and author of Green Cities, said the researchers
employed statistics to challenge conventional wisdom:
‘They used sophisticated econometrics to take a more
careful look at whether suburbanisation does indeed
make us fatter. Hopefully their methods will be adopted
by public health researchers seeking to tease out causality
based on raw correlation.’
This article summarises ‘Fat 
City: The Relationship between
Urban Sprawl and Obesity’ by 
Jean Eid, Henry Overman, Diego
Puga and Matthew Turner, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 758
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0758.pdf).
Henry Overman is a reader in
economic geography at LSE and
deputy director of CEP’s
globalisation programme. Jean Eid
and Matthew Turner are at the
University of Toronto. Diego Puga
is at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
People who move from compact
to sprawling neighbourhoods 
do not gain weight 
T
he Stern review is a
milestone in efforts to
tackle global warming.
The basic message is
clear: natural scientists
have gathered strong
evidence that human-induced climate
change is happening. Looking at the
economics, Stern finds that early and
strong action makes sense from a cost-
benefit perspective.
He has been criticised for reaching that
conclusion by allowing lower discount
rates for future costs and benefits as well
as giving more weight to potential one-off
catastrophic events than earlier studies. But
as many of the critics also point out,
coming up with any discount rate and
weight involves a good deal of value
judgement. What matters is that the orders
of magnitude are such that changing these
assumptions a little bit upwards leads to a
range of results where action seems both
desirable and quite affordable.
The more interesting question then
becomes what Stern actually proposes to
do. His suggestions focus first on market-
based schemes to internalise the costs of
greenhouse gas pollution. Implicitly
through a carbon trading scheme or
explicitly through a carbon tax, polluters
should price the costs of climate 
change into their decisions to conduct
polluting activities.
While this is standard environmental
economics, there is hope that the high
profile of the Stern Review and the
elaborate discussion on the concrete
design of such schemes will provide a
much-needed political boost.
The second major policy suggestion is
for a dramatic increase in public spending
on research into technologies and practices
to mitigate pollution. This includes
spending on the early deployment and
piloting of new technologies, recognising
that our eventual adjustment to mitigate
climate change will involve the
development of a series of such
technologies.
As Stern stresses, it is important that
there are measures in place to ensure that
this extra money is spent wisely. This could
involve, for example, an arm’s length
approach where money is allocated by
expert panels to a portfolio of the most
promising research projects.
Overall, Stern draws an optimistic
picture. Strong action is needed and it is
costly, but not so costly that it would be a
major obstacle to prosperity. The report
itself will be an important source of
reference in the discussion to come. 
But it also raises a number of immediate
questions.
First, a key requirement for success will
be strong, internationally agreed reduction
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Technologies 
to tackle 
global warming
The Stern Review of the economics of climate
change proposes a dramatic increase in public
spending on research into carbon-mitigating
technologies as well as market-based schemes
for trading and taxing pollution. Ralf Martin
suggests how these two policy elements might
be most effectively combined.
A doubling of
public R&D
funds could
be easily
achieved with
a low carbon
tax on US 
car owners
27
targets, which lead to significant increases
in the price of polluting activities. The
experience of climate change negotiations
so far makes it doubtful that strong
targets can be agreed on and complied
with. The carbon price that will eventually
emerge is likely to be below optimal levels.
This creates the risk of a final scheme that
is simply a revenue transfer from polluters
to the government, or whomever holds
the pollution rights, without inducing
significant behavioural changes that would
reduce pollution. Among other things,
such a scheme would be very unpopular.
Second, while increased spending on
research and development (R&D) is
certainly an important avenue, the report
leaves open where the extra spending will
come from.
My research leads me to a suggestion
that would address both issues: why not
combine the two policy elements and
design the internalisation scheme in a way
that raises some revenue?
In the case of a carbon trading
scheme, this can be achieved by
■ It is predicted that climate change caused by human activities
will raise global average temperatures by between 1.5 and 
5 degrees Celsius over the next 100 years. This could raise sea
levels by one metre or more and lead to a number of other
catastrophic climate changes and related phenomena. It could
also have some benefits such as bigger harvests in some
regions and longer and warmer summers.
■ Humanity’s main response to this problem is the United
Nations’ climate negotiation process. The most important
milestone of that process so far is the ‘Kyoto protocol’ which
has set targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and
which came into force in February 2005. 
■ Despite some attractive design elements, the Kyoto protocol
alone is unlikely to make much impact on greenhouse gas
emissions. This is mainly due to the failure of the agreement to
include most of the world’s current and future emissions,
which will arise in China, India and the United States.
■ If, as seems likely, this status quo continues, then R&D, which
leads to innovations that can both reduce the intensity of
carbon emissions and reduce costs, will become an even more
important part of the strategy to fight climate change.
■ While the Kyoto strategy of internationally agreed emission
targets might create some incentives to develop these
technologies, the incentives are probably insufficient. This
suggests that some additional direct support from
governments is required.
■ Another problem with targets is that by their very nature, they
have to be based on very unreliable forecasts of what can be
achieved in the future at reasonable costs. Pressing ahead with
ambitious targets – as is the current UK strategy – might
therefore risk wasting large amounts of public and private
money without having much impact on climate change.
■ To avoid the danger of excessive costs or politically disastrous
non-compliance, target schemes should include a ‘safety valve’
mechanism. 
■ We propose an innovative solution of a safety valve mechanism
operating through a Global Environmental R&D Fund. Countries
could convert excess carbon into contributions to a research
fund that would be used to develop technologies to reduce
climate change.
■ Such a fund could also be used to construct a much needed
enforcement mechanism for climate agreements if resulting
innovations could be used freely by participating countries but
licensed for a fee to non-participating countries.
Extract from CEP Policy Analysis – Climate Change: Economic 
Sense and Non-sense of Carbon Mitigation Policies – available at:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/briefings/pa_climate_change.pdf
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auctioning the permits rather than
allocating them for free (as currently
happens in the European Union’s emission
trading scheme introduced in January
2005). In the case of a tax, revenue
accrues naturally.
But rather than entering the general
tax revenue, this extra revenue should be
earmarked to contribute to the suggested
increase in public R&D spending. Because
the tax levels required to raise a revenue
stream that would make a difference in
R&D spending are likely to be much lower
than those that induce behavioural
changes, even a much watered down
internalisation scheme has the potential to
have a significant long-term impact on
climate change.
For example, a comparatively low
carbon tax in the United States on
emissions of carbon dioxide from
transportation of only $5 (which would
increase the average annual cost of
running a vehicle by $40) could raise a
budget equal to current world public
spending on energy R&D (which is
approximately $9 billion). In other words,
the suggested doubling of public R&D
funds could be easily achieved by US car
owners alone at a price that would hardly
induce them to stop driving. Earmarking
will also strengthen popular support.
A further issue concerns international
variations in R&D spending. Stern rightly
stresses the need to coordinate carbon
targets internationally. But international
coordination might also be required to
double R&D spending while avoiding 
some countries ‘free riding’ on other
countries’ spending.
This is underlined by the current huge
variations in public energy-related R&D
spending across industrialised countries
(see Figure 1). According to my
calculations, this ranges between $27 per
person in Japan, over $10 in the United
States and $1.20 in the UK.
Agreeing and committing to R&D
spending targets might also be easier than
agreeing on pollution targets. With the
former, governments know what they are
bargaining for. With pollution targets, the
uncertainty over future costs is very high.
Figure 1:
Public spending on energy R&D per capita 
(average values between 2001 and 2005 in 
US dollars at purchasing power parities)
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spending
targets might
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in 2006, Climate Change: Economic Sense and
Non-sense of Carbon Mitigation Policies (see
box for a summary).
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